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The U.K.’s Diverted Profits Tax: An Admission of
Defeat or a Pre-Emptive Strike?
by Sol Picciotto
To the surprise of many, U.K. Chancellor of theExchequer George Osborne proposed on Decem-
ber 3 a diverted profits tax (DPT) on multinational
companies (MNCs). This seems to be an admission
that the major effort for international tax reform — the
OECD’s base erosion and profit-shifting initiative,
which the U.K. helped to get off the ground — may
fail to ensure that MNCs can be taxed ‘‘where eco-
nomic activities take place and value is created,’’ as
mandated by the G-20 world leaders in the St. Peters-
burg Declaration of September 2013. It may also be a
first strike in the complex negotiation process involved
in completing the OECD’s BEPS package and imple-
menting the various interacting measures at interna-
tional and national levels.
The implications of this proposal are hard to evalu-
ate in full, not least because the contents of the pro-
posal are couched in the mind-numbing legalese that is
the specialty of Treasury legal counsel and parliamen-
tary draftsmen. They have exceeded themselves on this
occasion, and the explanatory notes provided are no
clearer. Perhaps the aim is to shroud the implications
of the controversial measures in logical and lexical
semantics.
Another reason for the proposal’s impenetrable
complexity might be the need to make it as hard as
possible to challenge the legal validity of the provisions
under either tax treaty rules or EU law.1 Indeed, the
DPT might also be impugned on public law grounds
for vagueness and giving excess discretion to officials
to make decisions with major financial consequences
for companies. If the intention is to provide protection
from such challenges through technical complexity, the
draft legislation succeeds surprisingly well. Its combina-
tion of complex and specific rules and general antia-
voidance principles may be enough to protect it from
invalidation under EU corporate mobility rules. No
doubt equally ingenious minds will set to work to find
legal grounds for a challenge, and may find clients in-
terested in mounting such an attack. But such legal
proceedings would take years to wind their way
through to any sort of conclusion.
1The DPT has been designed as a new tax, which HM Rev-
enue & Customs believes is compatible with both tax treaties and
EU law as an antiabuse measure.
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The author explains the draft legislation for
the U.K.’s proposed diverted profits tax and
analyzes the relationship of the provisions to
the reforms under negotiation through the
BEPS process of the G-20 and OECD. Although
the official U.K. position is that the proposals
are not out of line, they clearly go beyond
what has been proposed so far in the BEPS
project. Hence, they seem to be either an ad-
mission that international agreement will not
be reached that would satisfy U.K. concerns or
an attempt to put pressure on the negotiators
to do so.
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This article must therefore be accompanied by a dis-
claimer: Despite having spent many hours struggling to
decipher the proposal, I am not confident I have done
so correctly, and certainly not completely.
Scope of the Tax
The tax is intended to apply to two types of cases.
The first is when a foreign company supplies goods
or services to U.K. customers and activities take place
in the U.K. in connection with such supply but in a
way that it is ‘‘reasonable to assume’’ is designed to
ensure that the foreign company has no permanent
establishment in the U.K. Under current rules, taxable
presence depends on having a PE, which entails some
kind of physical presence.2 The OECD decided some
10 years ago that a website or other ‘‘virtual’’ presence
does not amount to a PE.3 This decision gave a great
advantage to Internet-based MNCs, but it is now being
reconsidered under action 1 of the BEPS project by the
Task Force on the Digital Economy.
If the measure stopped there, it would likely bring
in billions, rather than around £350 million per year as
estimated by the Treasury and HM Revenue & Cus-
toms.4 It is nevertheless aimed at the big fish, since
small or medium-size enterprises are exempt and the
tax applies only if the total U.K. sales exceed £10 mil-
lion. However, there are two other conditions in this
type of case.
The first condition is that the foreign company must
also be involved in ‘‘mismatch’’ arrangements with a
related entity in connection with the supply of those
goods or services. Mismatch arrangements are defined
as transactions that increase the expenses or reduce the
income of one related party and hence its tax liability
and when the tax actually paid by the other related
party as a result of those transactions is less than 80
percent of that reduction of tax liability resulting from
the mismatch. It is important to note this tax saving
includes non-U.K. taxes.
These mismatch arrangements must also involve
‘‘insufficient economic substance,’’ in at least one of
three ways. The first is where a single transaction be-
tween related parties produces a tax reduction greater
than any other financial benefit, and it is ‘‘reasonable
to assume’’ the transaction was designed to do so. The
second is where such a transaction is part of a series.
The third is where a party to the mismatch arrange-
ment contributes economic value to the transaction(s)
that is less than the financial benefit of the tax reduc-
tion, and it is ‘‘reasonable to assume’’ that party’s in-
volvement was designed to achieve such tax reduction.
Economic value is to be evaluated ‘‘in terms of the
functions or activities that the staff of that person per-
form.’’ An arrangement may be considered designed to
produce a tax reduction even if it is also designed to
produce another objective.
The second condition applies if, in connection with
the supply of goods or services to the U.K., it is rea-
sonable to assume that ‘‘arrangements are in place the
main purpose or one of the main purposes of which is
to avoid’’ (U.K.) corporation tax. This is not subject to
any other stipulations, so it is potentially quite broad.
However, it is still focused on sales to U.K. customers
organized in such a way as to avoid having a PE. It is
perhaps a fail-safe provision anticipating the possibility
of new types of avoidance schemes that fall outside the
concept of mismatch.
The second type of case is where transactions be-
tween a U.K. resident company and a related entity
involve mismatch arrangements between them, as well
as insufficient economic substance, defined in the same
way as for the first case. Hence, this does not require
sales into the U.K. by a foreign company but applies to
a company in the U.K. that exploits mismatches.
The first case can indeed be thought of as a
‘‘Google tax,’’ the label that the DPT has been given,
since it aims at foreign companies avoiding tax on
sales in the U.K. by not having a PE while also avoid-
ing tax in other countries using arrangements such as
the famous ‘‘double Irish.’’ The second case could be
called a ‘‘Starbucks tax,’’ as it applies to companies
that have a U.K. taxable presence but reduce their U.K.
profits by transactions with a related entity in such a
way that the U.K. tax reduction is not substantially
matched by an increase in the tax liability of the re-
lated entity, if it has insufficient economic substance.
This seems aimed at the equally well-known ‘‘Dutch
sandwich,’’ widely used by many MNCs.
Confessing to the Revenue
Starbucks is relevant, too, because the proposals also
require a company to ’fess up to the Revenue if it is
‘‘reasonable to assume’’ that it has generated taxable
diverted profits. Starbucks, it may be recalled, offered
voluntarily to ‘‘forgo certain deductions’’ so as to pay
£20 million in tax over two years, as a result of the
public outcry following the revelations of its use of the
2In U.K. law, this is now under the Corporation Tax Act
2010, Part 24, chapter 2, which is based on and elaborates ar-
ticles 5 and 7 of tax treaties.
3OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs, Clarification on the Appli-
cation of the Permanent Establishment Definition in E-Commerce:
Changes to the Commentary on the Model Tax Convention on Article 5
(2000); and OECD, Are the Current Treaty Rules for Taxing Business
Profits Appropriate for Taxing E-Commerce? Final Report (2005).
4According to the Office of Budget Responsibility, the esti-
mates are based on HMRC’s analysis of actual taxpayer returns
(evidence to the House of Commons Treasury Committee, Dec.
4, 2014). Google paid U.K. corporation tax of £20 million in
2013, while its total U.K. revenue is £3.6 billion; applying
Google’s worldwide profit rate of 20 percent, the 25 percent di-
verted profits tax would yield £180 million from this company
alone. See Juliette Garside and Jill Treanor, ‘‘Osborne to intro-
duce ‘Google tax,’’’ The Guardian [U.K.], Dec. 3, 2014.
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‘‘Dutch sandwich.’’5 These proposals would make it
compulsory for such a company to come clean and pay
up. This would obviously save HMRC a lot of trouble
but relies on companies being able and willing to de-
cide that it is ‘‘reasonable to assume’’ that they have
been dodging taxes. More likely the hope is that MNCs
will be persuaded to restructure to avoid the threat of a
25 percent DPT, compared to the current standard cor-
porate income tax rate of 20 percent.
The reliance on ‘‘reasonable assumptions’’ also ex-
tends to calculation of the amount of these diverted
profits. For the first case (sales into the U.K.), they are
the profits that it would be ‘‘just and reasonable’’ to
assume would have been made if those sales had been
attributable to the ‘‘avoided PE’’ in the U.K. It would
be interesting to find out how this tax base will be de-
fined in practice, although because it will likely be
done by negotiation with individual companies, the
specifics will probably be confidential. The gross sales
revenue should be fairly easy to ascertain in most cases
because these companies must be subject to U.K. value
added tax registration under distance selling rules and
data could presumably be taken from this source. The
problem will lie in identifying the costs attributable to
those sales, because many will be incurred outside the
U.K. The simplest method would be apportionment
based on consolidated accounts, but in view of the fre-
quently expressed U.K. opposition to such an ap-
proach, it is unlikely to be accepted explicitly. The data
to be made available in the country-by-country reports
resulting from the BEPS action plan might also be
helpful, but again the U.K. government would be reluc-
tant to use them for this purpose.
For the second case, the taxable profits are, less con-
tentiously, to be determined by applying U.K. transfer
pricing rules to the profits transferred by the mismatch
arrangements.
However, different and even more complex rules
specify how the ‘‘designated’’ HMRC officer should
arrive at a ‘‘best estimate’’ when issuing a tax assess-
ment to the company. The bill also provides elaborate
procedures for such an assessment; these include a no-
tice from HMRC to the company stating the calcula-
tions involved, a right for the company to make repre-
sentations, an obligation on HMRC to review the
assessment (which enables negotiations), and rights of
appeal against the assessment (although the assessed
tax must first be paid).
Reasons for the Proposals
The main puzzle is why the U.K. is proposing to
introduce these measures at a point when the OECD is
barely halfway through the 30-month process of debat-
ing and formulating the reforms promised in the BEPS
project.
The immediate reasons seem to be primarily politi-
cal. The DPT bill was presented as part of the autumn
statement package of fiscal projections and proposals
for the budget to be introduced in the spring, a month
before the next general election. The package from the
right-wing Conservative chancellor of the coalition
government projected a further drastic increase in pub-
lic spending cuts, aiming to achieve a budget surplus
by 2019-2020, which independent observers suggested
would change the role of the state ‘‘beyond recogni-
tion.’’ In view especially of the impending elections in
May 2015, this continuation of austerity policies needs
some counterbalancing measures. This tax is one of
the few measures listed in the statement under the
heading of ‘‘Fairness.’’ Experience shows that Conser-
vative politicians are more likely to introduce measures
that appear tough on companies, as they have a greater
need to soften their image than their Labour oppo-
nents, who are usually more concerned about alienat-
ing business. But it should be borne in mind that this
chancellor also regularly stresses the need for the
U.K.’s corporate taxes to be ‘‘competitive’’ and crafted
legislation that essentially moved the U.K. to a territo-
rial tax system on MNCs, as well as introducing the
‘‘patent box.’’
The proposals also could be seen as a stopgap. They
provide a complex and legalistic way of doing what
could have been done if the U.K. tax authorities had
been willing to be as creative in interpreting tax rules
to ensure that companies pay tax according to the eco-
nomic substance of their activities as the companies’
tax advisers have been in avoiding such taxes. As re-
vealed in media reports, Google’s U.K. affiliate, which
claims to engage only in ‘‘marketing,’’ is closely in-
volved in the sales of advertising only notionally
‘‘booked’’ to its Irish affiliate (considered by Ireland as
resident in Bermuda). Thus, HMRC could have
deemed the U.K. affiliate to constitute a PE of the
Irish one, bringing its U.K. sales profits into U.K. tax.
This approach has been used by tax authorities in
other countries, such as India,6 Italy, and Spain.7 How-
ever, such an approach has been challenged in court,
sometimes sucessfully, which was presumably why
HMRC decided not to take the risk without the back-
ing of new statutory provisions.
Third, the possibility that the U.K.’s general anti-
abuse rule could have been extended to cover this situ-
ation must have been considered. However, the govern-
ment’s pledge that international arrangements would
5Randall Jackson, ‘‘Starbucks Pays First U.K. Corporate Tax
Since 2009,’’ Tax Notes Int’l, July 1, 2013, p. 22.
6Income Tax Officer v. Right Florist PVT Ltd., ITA 1336/Kol./
2011: Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Kolkata B Bench (2013).
7Adolfo Martín Jiménez, ‘‘Preventing the Artificial Avoidance
of PE Status,’’ U.N. Tax Committee, Sept. 2014, section 5.3.2.
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not be covered by this already weak rule may have
been too recent for that to have been a realistic option,
although it may well be a part of the OECD’s agenda
for potential changes.
Implications for Tax Reforms
More interesting to consider is why the U.K. has
introduced what amounts to a unilateral measure when
major multilateral international tax reforms, through
the OECD’s BEPS project, are still being formulated. It
seems reasonable to assume (to adopt the key phrase in
the proposals) that the U.K. thinks that the BEPS proj-
ect may fail to effectively deal with these problems, or
that the likely measures may not suit the U.K. There is
evidence to support both of these.
The OECD published proposals in November to
deal with so-called abuse of PE rules. However, these
would cover only a limited range of situations, where a
foreign company supplying goods or services to a
country also has an affiliate there that is involved in
activities resulting in sales contracts. These might cover
a case such as Google’s in the U.K., in view of the
‘‘marketing’’ activities, but they would not extend to
other Internet sales companies — for example, Ama-
zon, which sells directly from its website but has affili-
ates in most countries engaged in after-sales activities
such as customer support and order fulfillment. The
concept of an ‘‘avoided PE’’ in the DPT bill is wider
than the slight expansion envisaged in the OECD pro-
posals. The requirement that there also be both ‘‘mis-
match’’ arrangements and lack of economic substance
narrows the scope, but the alternative tax avoidance
purpose test means that it has a potentially much
broader reach. However, it also creates uncertainty re-
garding operation of the tax.
The concept of ‘‘mismatch’’ arrangements goes be-
yond anything the OECD has yet proposed. The U.K.
proposals build on the OECD’s September recommen-
dations on hybrid mismatch arrangements, but these
are much more specific and the subject of consulta-
tions in the U.K. is based on another paper in the au-
tumn statement package. The provisions also seem out
of line with the EU rules in the recently revised parent-
subsidiary directive, which aims to implement the
OECD’s hybrid mismatch proposals. This may be a
likely basis for a legal challenge to the DPT, by a firm
willing to risk public opprobrium by doing so.
The main thrust of the DPT, it seems, is a pre-
emptive move by the U.K. to assert some jurisdiction
over the large pools of earnings, estimated at some $2
trillion, retained ‘‘offshore’’ especially by U.S.-based
MNCs.8 Reforms to transfer pricing rules, especially on
intangibles, envisaged in the BEPS action plan would
reduce the size of these pools to some extent by at-
tempting to reattribute earnings based on analysis of
the ‘‘functions, assets, and risks’’ borne by the various
affiliates of a MNC group. Nevertheless, there would
remain large ‘‘residual’’ profits amassed in corporate
cash-box holding companies.
A strengthening of rules on controlled foreign cor-
porations, which may result from another of the BEPS
action plan points, would reinforce the tax claims of
the MNC’s home jurisdiction while also acting as a
disincentive to shifting profits from source countries.
The DPT seems to be an assertion of a tax claim from
the source country side, pre-empting residence country
claims that might result from such stronger CFC rules.
The intention may be not only to influence the BEPS
process but also to pressure the U.S. Congress to re-
form the U.S. CFC rules in subpart F. This may ex-
plain why, despite the potentially broad scope of the
tax, the estimate of revenues it might produce is rela-
tively modest.
These interactions show that the next stage of the
BEPS project, including implementation, will entail
some competition between states over allocation of
these revenues. Robert Stack, Treasury deputy assistant
secretary (international tax affairs), suggested on Sep-
tember 23 that the OECD debates this year will focus
on allocation of cash-box returns.9 The U.K. has
staked its claim through this tax, although the projec-
tion of comparatively modest sums to be raised by the
DPT suggests that the government is willing to negoti-
ate and compromise.
The U.K. is not alone. Australia is also contemplat-
ing a Google tax. Early in December China’s Xinhua
news agency quoted Zhang Zhiyong, recently pro-
moted deputy director of the State Administration of
Taxation, as saying that China will closely audit
foreign-owned companies to guard against BEPS,
though he stressed that it will coordinate with other
countries.
Now the ball is in the OECD’s court. If it can en-
sure a comprehensive and coherent package from the
BEPS project, unilateral measures such as the DPT
could be folded into the multilateral framework. Re-
grettably, it seems more likely that the outcome will be
measures that are complex and leave considerable
scope for interpretation and hence conflicts. The DPT
proposal stakes out the U.K.’s claim in anticipation. ◆
8Richard Phillips, Steve Wamhoff, and Dan Smith, ‘‘Offshore
Shell Games: The Use of Offshore Tax Havens by Fortune 500
Companies,’’ PIRG/Citizens for Tax Justice (2014).
9Margaret Burow, David D. Stewart, and Kristen A. Parillo,
‘‘Stack Provides Insights on BEPS Reports, Outlines Next
Steps,’’ Tax Notes Int’l, Sept. 29, 2014, p. 1087.
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